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ABSTRACT

Proposing any major new federal initiative regarding water in the
western United States might seem preposterous, given conventional
wisdom and entrenched positions on state control of water resources.
But there is a strong rationale, and a growing imperative, for a new
federal water .policy for the West. Many river basins face serious
problems as limited water supplies are over-allocated, demands
continue to increase, and climate change promises to exacerbate the
West's perennial problems of scarcity and variability. Solutions to
such problems are likely to be expensive and will need to address
national interests as well as state and local concerns. Like the first two
eras of federal water policy-water project development, followed by
environmental protection-the third wave will need to bring federal
money to the table in proportion to the size of the problems to be
solved. But that money will come with important conditions, helping
to ensure that western water problems are resolved in a way that
meets national needs. This Article begins by summarizing the value
of the federal role in western water management, examining the first
two waves of federal water policy, and exploring how Congress
employed a broadly similar approach to both building water supply
projects and regulating water quality. It then turns to indications of
modern demands for federal involvement in western water issues, and
concludes with observations about important elements of a third wave
of federal water policy for the West.
INTRODUCTION

W

hen the 113th Congress passed the Water Resources Reform
and Development Act (WRRDA) of 2014,1 it was remarkable
in more ways than one. A Congress that generally dislikes federal
involvement in matters of natural resources had directed the Army
Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to undertake numerous water-related
2
activities, and authorized nearly three dozen new projects. 3 A
I Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-121, 128
Stat. 1193.
2 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), commenting on the version of the WRRDA
bill that would soon become law, noted that key provisions of the bill will: (1) "expand
and clarify the Corps' authority to control invasive aquatic species, implement flood
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Congress notoriously reluctant to spend taxpayer dollars had enacted
4
a bill with a federal price tag far exceeding $12 billion. And a
Congress noted for partisan rancor and disagreement-arguably the
least productive Congress in American history -had approved this
legislation by a combined vote of 503 to 11.6
The nearly unanimous enactment of the WRRDA shows that there
is still broad support, and strong demand, for some federal activities
relating to water resources. In the arid West, however, any suggestion
of a new federal role in water management is sure to collide with
conventional wisdom and entrenched positions. Conventional wisdom
has it that the federal government has consistently deferred to state
water law, leaving states in charge of making water resource
decisions. 7 Moreover, western state officials, and traditional water
users with rights protected by state law, adamantly insist that any
federal involvement (or "interference") in water matters must respect

control and environmental protection projects, and assist Indian tribes with water resources
projects"; (2) "direct the Corps to consult with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to develop a levee safety program and would reauthorize the Dam Safety
Program"; and (3) "expand the Corps' responsibilities for maintaining harbors and
authorize the Corps and EPA to implement pilot projects and provide loans and loan
guarantees to nonfederal entities to complete water infrastructure projects." Letter from
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to The Hon. Bill Shuster, Chairman,
House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure (May 19, 2014) (on file with author).
3 The CBO noted that the WRRDA will "authorize the construction of 34 new waterrelated projects," and also "increase the total costs allowable for construction of eight
existing projects." Id.
4 The CBO estimated that the WRRDA would cost $5.4 billion to implement during the
2015-19 period and $6.9 billion during the 2020-24 period, "with additional spending
continuing for many years after 2024." Id.
5 See generally Ed O'Keefe & Sean Sullivan, Senate Abruptly Wraps Up, Capping
Least Productive Congress in Modern History, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/another-republican-upends-the-senates-year-end
-plans/2014/12/I-6/127292d8-8559-11 c4-9534-f79a23c40e6cstory.html.
6 The votes on final passage of the WRRDA conference report were 412-4 in the House
and 91-7 in the Senate. H.R.3080-Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 3th-congress/house-bill/3080/all-info
(last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
7 The Supreme Court has declared that Congress has consistently deferred to state water
law, especially in two opinions handed down on the same day and authored by thenAssociate Justice Rehnquist. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978) (stating
that the history of irrigation in the West shows a "consistent thread of purposeful and
continued deference to state water law by Congress"); United States v. New Mexico, 438
U.S. 696, 702 (1978) ("Where Congress has expressly addressed the question of whether
federal entities must abide by state water law, it has almost invariably deferred to the state
law.").
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8
the "primary" role of states in water allocation and management.
These factors, and the failure of many efforts to establish anything
like a federal water policy for the West, 9 indicate the challenges that
would be sure to confront any proposal for a new or expanded federal
role in addressing the region's important water issues.
There is a competing argument, however, and it is not entirely
radical: federal laws and institutions already play important roles in

western water management, reflecting the reality that federal law has
sometimes taken precedence to protect national interests in water
resources.' 0 Despite questions about the appropriate federal role,
Congress has already established hugely significant programs relating
to water because it saw important problems of national significance
that could not be resolved without federal intervention. Today, major
western river basins are facing similarly significant problems, as
limited water supplies are over-allocated, demands continue to
increase, and climate change promises to exacerbate the West's

perennial problems of scarcity and variability. Solutions to such
8 For example, in a 2014 policy statement, the Western Governors' Association
declared, "As the preeminent authority on water management within their boundaries,
states have the right to develop, use, control and distribute the surface water and
groundwater located within their boundaries, subject.to international treaties and interstate
agreements and judicial decrees." W. GOVERNORS' ASS'N, POLICY RESOLUTION 2014-03,
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST B.I (2014), available at http://www
.westgov.org/images/stories/policies/Water _ResourceManagement in the West.pdf. The
statement also insisted that "[t]he federal government has long recognized the right to use
water as determined under the laws of the various states," and that "[n]othing in any act of
Congress or Executive Branch regulatory action should be construed as affecting or
intending to affect states' primacy over the allocation and administration of their water
resources." Id.
B.l.a. For its part, the National Water Resources Association, a
confederation of western water user organizations, takes the position that federal agencies
have improperly used federal environmental laws in a way that is inconsistent with state
water laws, and that
[a]ny attempt to condition, restrict, or prohibit the appropriation, storage, carriage
and consumptive use of water through regulation under federal environmental
laws must be consistent with and take into account state water law. It is urged
that the present Administration continue to support a strong system of
water
allocation and management by the respective states.
Position Statements, NAT'L WATER RES. COUNCIL
12, http://www.nwra.org/position
-statements.htmt (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
9 See Janet C. Neuman, Federal Water Policy: An Idea Whose Time Will (Finally)
Come, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 114-16 (2001) (explaining reasons why federal water
policy does not exist). "The simple mention of 'federal' water policy in some parts of the
western United States is akin to ordering a gardenburger at a cattlemen's convention." Id.
at 115.
10 See generally Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs.
State Authority Under FederalLaws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241.

2015]

The Greenback, the Humpback, and the Silverback:
How a Third Wave of Federal Water Policy Could Benefit the West

689

problems are likely to be expensive and will need to address national
interests as well as state and local concerns.
Thus, there is a strong rationale, and a growing imperative, for a
new federal water policy for the West. Like the first two eras of
federal water policy-water project development and environmental
protection-the third wave will need to bring federal money to the
table in proportion to the size of the problems to be solved. Federal
money will come with important conditions, helping to ensure that
western water problems are resolved in a way that meets national
needs.
This Article begins by summarizing the value of the federal role in
western water management, symbolized by "the greenback, the
humpback, and the silverback." It then examines the first two waves
of federal water policy, exploring how Congress employed a broadly
similar approach to both building water supply projects and regulating
water quality. The Article then turns to indications of modem
demands for federal involvement in western water issues, and
concludes with observations about important elements of a third wave
of federal water policy for the West.
I
THE VALUE OF THE FEDERAL ROLE [N WATER MANAGEMENT

Western states and water users have long regarded the federal role
in water matters as problematic, and perhaps more trouble than it is
worth. "1Some people oppose any new federal action relating to water

I I Within a decade of Congress passing the 1902 Reclamation Act, Wyoming officials
were voicing great resentment against the federal government for its activities and attitude
in that state. T.A. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING 357-58 (2d ed. 1978); see infra notes
85-104 and accompanying text (explaining the 1902 Act). In 1909, the governor of
Wyoming criticized federal agencies-presumably the Reclamation Service--"whose
meddlesome activity frequently acts as a hindrance to our development, and hence irritates
our people." LARSON, supra note 11, at 357. The state engineer accused the agency of
ignoring state laws, among other transgressions, and wrote "[t]he present attitude of the
Reclamation Service must change radically before any real good can be accomplished in
this state by it." Id. at 358. In the 1950s and '60s, one of the major controversies in federal
water policy was the acreage limit for receiving subsidized water from Reclamation
projects, which had always been a key part of the federal program; large landowners
(especially in California) wanted the cheap water but rebelled against the acreage limits.
See generally Paul S. Taylor, Excess Land'Law: Calculated Circumvention, 52 CALIF. L.

REv. 978 (1964). In 1971, the great water law scholar Frank Trelease wrote,
When [federal] and state law clash, when gaps appear, when federal law upsets
that which state law has set up ...

then there is federal-state conflict in the field
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resources in the West, a view seemingly held by the current majority
of the House Natural Resources Committee. 12 The' record shows,
however, that federal laws, programs, and institutions have proved
their worth in developing and protecting the nation's waters.
The value of federal involvement in this context can be
summarized, or symbolized, by three things: the greenback, the
humpback, and the silverback. The greenback, of course, is money:
federal dollars spent on things such as infrastructure projects. The
humpback refers to the humpback chub, a native fish species in the
Colorado River system, representing national priorities (in this case
endangered species) that would go more or less unprotected without
federal law. Lastly, the silverback is a dominant male gorilla-a
metaphor for the federal government's role in ensuring that states
meet their legal responsibilities despite local resistance-a role that
former EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus once referred to as
"the gorilla in the closet."' 13 This Section briefly explains each of

of water rights. There is confusion, uncertainty, bad feeling, jealousy and
bitterness. To a substantial degree, this is what exists today.
FRANK J. TRELEASE; NAT'L WATER COMM'N, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER

LAW 11 (1971).
12For example, on June 24, 2014, the House Water and Power Subcommittee held a
hearing entitled "New Federal Schemes to Soak Up Water Authority: Impacts on States,
Water Users, Recreation, and Job's [sic]." Press Release, House Comm. on Natural Res.,
Witnesses Agree Proposed Water Rights Regulations Continue the "Obama Knows Best"
Water Policies (June 24, 2014), available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploaded
files/624-14_wprelease.pdf. The Natural Resources Committee's press release stated that
recent federal agency actions "turn over longstanding water rights and eliminate multiple
land and water uses on and off federal lands," represent "executive agencies running
amok," and they "fundamentally alter .. .the relationship between the states and the
federal government . "d.
I.."An earlier hearing focused on legislation, H.R. 3189, and its
GOP sponsor said it would "protect local water rights from federal government overreach
and takings .... Press Release, House Comm. on Natural Res., Witnesses, Members
Agree Rep. Tipton's Legislation Needed to Prevent Federal Water Grab (Oct. 10, 2013),
available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/l0-1013_wpjtipton-leg.pdf.
13 In his second stint as EPA administrator, Ruckelshaus said in a 1984 speech to EPA
employees that although the states had the interest and capacity to control pollution, "[the
EPA's] responsibility is not to get along with the states, it is to insure compliance ...
unless [the states] have a gorilla in the closet, they can't do the job. And the gorilla is the
EPA." Steven D. Shermer, The Efficiency of Private Participation in Regulating and
Enforcing the Federal Pollution Control Laws: A Model for Citizen Involvement, 14 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 466 (1999). While his comment referred to environmental
regulation rather than water management, the states, whatever their intentions, have the
same trouble standing up to their politically powerful water users as they do their polluting
industries. In the water context, the federal "gorilla" can ensure that the states don't just
serve their local interests at the expense of the environment, tribes, or downstream states.
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influence in the context of water

A. The Greenback:Big Bucks to Address Big Challenges
Some of the federal government's most important contributions
regarding water have involved spending large sums of money, often
for infrastructure projects. In the first half of the twentieth century,
project opponents unsuccessfully challenged the government's
authority to construct certain projects, arguing that some purposes
exceeded Congress' powers regarding water. 14 Since 1950, however,
it is clear that Congress may authorize construction of water projects
under the General Welfare Clause and the constitutional spending
power, without
the need to rely on a traditional federal purpose such
•
15
as navigation.
The construction and operation of federal water projects has
transformed the nation's aquatic landscape. In the West, the Bureau of
Reclamation (Reclamation) built hundreds of dams, especially once
the program
16 expanded to serve municipal, industrial, and hydropower
purposes;
currently, Reclamation has 337 reservoirs in its
portfolio. 17 Nationally, the Corps was even more prolific, building
nearly 700 dams for flood control, hydropower, and other purposes.8
These projects represent a truly massive investment of federal funds,
totaling roughly $22 billion for Reclamation projects alone. 9
14 See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931) (upholding authorization of the
Bureau of Reclamation's Boulder Canyon Project on the Colorado River); Oklahoma ex
rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (upholding authorization of the
Corps' Denison Dam on the Red River). '
15 United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738-39 (1950) (determining
that the general welfare and spending powers supported authorization of the Bureau of
Reclamation's Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River).
16 See generally Donald J. Pisani, Federal Reclamation in the Twentieth Century: A
Centennial Retrospective, in THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: HISTORY ESSAYS FROM
THE CENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM VOLUMES I AND 11611 (2008), available at http://www
.usbr.gov/history/Symposium_2008/HistoricalEssays.pdf.
17Bureau of Reclamation Quickfacts, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, http://www.usbr.gov/facts.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
18 Dam Safety Program, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, http://www.usace.army.mil
/Missions/CivilWorks/DamSafetyProgram.aspx (last visited Aug. 7, 2014).
19 According to a 1996 GAO report, as of 1994, the federal government spent $21.8
billion to construct 133 Reclamation water projects. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: INFORMATION ON ALLOCATION AND REPAYMENT OF COSTS
OF CONSTRUCTING WATER PROJECTS 23 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 GAO REPORT]. There
appears to be no parallel estimate of the total cost of all Army Corps of Engineers projects,
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The costs of these projects cannot be measured solely in dollars, of
course; the Corps and Reclamation are somewhat legendary for the
environmental impacts of their handiwork.
However, the
corresponding benefits have been substantial. For example,
Reclamation claims to deliver water to 10 million acres of farmland,
generate 15% of the nation's hydropower, supply municipal and
industrial water for 31 million people, and host 90 million
recreational visitor days annually. 2 I For its part, the Corps claims that
its flood control projects save $3 billion per year in flood damages,
that its reservoirs host more than 40 million visitor days,22 and that it
generates 24% of the nation's hydropower.2 3
Federal money spent on water infrastructure has often yielded
benefits, beyond the projects themselves, in the form of practical
incentives for resolving looming disputes between sovereigns.
Through much of the twentieth century, the lure of federal water
projects helped motivate states to enter into compacts for allocating
the water of interstate river systems. As stated by one authority,
It has been suggested that "[m]ost compacts represent compromises
reached by the water resource establishments of the signatory states
against a background of urgent need (or at least desire) for federal
benefits that are contingent upon agreement being reached." The
federal benefits typically were the funding and building of water
development projects using interstate waters, projects that by
common understanding were not likely to be funded by Congress

but given that the Corps has roughly twice as many reservoirs as Reclamation, the number
is almost certainly higher.
20 In his chapter "The Go-Go Years," Marc Reisner summed up the impacts of the peak
period of federal dam construction on the nation's rivers. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC

DESERT 151-75 (1st ed. 1986). Congress authorized a huge number of Reclamation
projects from 1928 to 1956, "along with hundreds of projects built by the Corps of
Engineers in the East and West. In that astonishingly brief twenty-eight-year period ...the
most fateful transformation that has ever been visited on any landscape, anywhere, was
wrought. It was a profound change-profound and permanent" Id. at 172. Reisner's
summary of the impacts of the Corps' efforts to improve navigation on the nation's major
river systems appears at page 177.
21 Quickfacts, supra note 17.
22 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Overview, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,

http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/FactSheets/FactSheetArticleView/tabid/219/Article/475
462/us-army-corps-of-engineers-overview.aspx (last visitedAug. 7, 2014).
23 USACE Hydropower-Renewable, Reliable, Energy Independence for America, U.S.ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (Apr. 10, 2013), available at http://www.usace.army.mil
/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/budget/strongpt/fy2OI4sphydropower.pdf.
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absent agreemen 4by the affected states regarding allocation of the
interstate waters.
More recently, federal money for water infrastructure and other
tangible benefits for Indian Country has been a crucial element of
tribal water rights settlements that help resolve bitter disputes over
reserved right claims. 25 For example, the Navajo Nation's claims to
water from the San Juan River in New Mexico were settled largely
through authorization of a pipeline project costing more than $1
billion, to be constructed almost entirely with federal funds.2 6
B. The Humpback. FederalLaw to Promote National Priorities
Despite conventional wisdom about deference to state authority,
federal water law has played a major role in the West for more than a
century. The 1899 Supreme Court decision in United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. showed that the federal government
would sometimes be at odds with the states over water, and that
federal law would not simply allow states to allocate water at the
expense of national interests. 27 In that case, the Court blocked a
proposed dam on the Rio Grande in New Mexico that had been
authorized under territorial law, applying a federal statute prohibiting
"the creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law,
28
to the navigable capacity of any waters" subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
The Court also observed in dictum that a state could not deny the
United States, as an owner of land along a stream, the right to such

24 DOUGLAS L. GRANT & GREGORY S. WEBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER

LAW 495 (8th ed. 2010) (quoting Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 48 (1966)).
25 See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN

LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 767-74 (7th ed. 2014) (summarizing tribal water settlements
generally, and providing a table of approved settlements with the financial cost of each).
"Virtually all [settlements] created trust funds of mostly federal money for tribes to invest
in water development or economic development activities. The funds ranged from $6
million to over $150 million." Id. at 768.
26 Jerold Widdison, Navajo-Gallup Water Supply Project,in WATER MATTERS! 20-1, at

20-3 to -5 (2014), available at http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/water-matters-2014/20
-navajo-gallup-water-supply-project.pdf. This pipeline will also provide important offreservation benefits by bringing a sustainable water supply to the city of Gallup, New
Mexico. Id. at 20-3.
27 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
28 Id. at 707 (quoting Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 907, § 10, 26
Stat. 426, 454 (1890) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2012))).
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water "as may
be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government
29

property.",

The Court would soon give effect to those words in the landmark
case of Winters v. United States, holding that an Indian reservation in
Montana had an implied water right-under federal law-to the water
needed for irrigation by its resident tribes. 30 Although the treaty
establishing the reservation said nothing about water, the Court held
that water rights are essential to the treaty's basic goal of helping
tribes become farmers. 3 1 The Court rejected arguments about state
control over water resources in Winters,3 2 and did so again in Arizona
v. California,33 reinforcing and clarifying the law as applied to Indian
reservations, 34 and establishing that other federally designated lands
could have "reserved rights" to the water needed to fulfill their
35
specific purposes.
The federal government has also asserted national priorities in
hydropower-planning and promoting development of major
hydroelectric projects-over state objections. Although the Federal
Power Act contains at least two provisions that seem to give states
significant authority regarding proposed hydropower projects, 3 6 a
series of Supreme Court cases interpreted those provisions narrowly,
leaving a federal agency firmly in control of project licensing
decisions. 37 In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal
29

Id. at 703.

30 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).

31 Id.
32 Id. at 577.
33 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
34 Id. at 597-600.
35 Id. at 601.
36 The Federal Power Act requires a federal license, issued by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, or FERC (formerly the Federal Power Commission), prior to
construction of a hydropower project. 16 U.S.C. § 802 (2012). Section 9(b) of the statute
requires a license applicant to show FERC that it has "complied with the requirements" of
the laws of the state where the project will be located "with respect to bed and banks and
to the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes." Id. § 802(a)(2). In
addition, section 27 provides that the Federal Power Act shall not be construed as
impairing state laws "relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein." Id.

§ 821.
37 First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946); Fed.
Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); California v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490 (1990). In each of these cases, the Commission approved a project
that would have had lesser environmental impacts if state law, or state agency
recommendations, had been followed.
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Power Commission, the Court held that giving full effect to those
provisions would mean that a state could essentially have veto power
over a federally licensed project, which "easily could destroy the
effectiveness of the Federal [Power] Act ...[and] subordinate to the
control of the State the 'comprehensive' planning which the Act
provides shall depend upon the judgment of the Federal Power
Comnission ...,38
Most recently, Congress has established certain environmental
goals as national priorities, most notably through the Clean Water Act
(discussed below) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).3 9 The ESA
seeks to conserve threatened and endangered species and the
ecosystems on which they depend.4 0 Although the ESA is not specific
to water-dependent species, it almost immediately became
controversial in the context of water development, when the discovery
and listing of the snail darter threatened to derail a nearly completed
federal dam.41 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme
Court held that the Tellico Dam could not be completed without
violating the ESA, declaring "beyond doubt that Congress intended
,,••
42
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.
And
while Congress directed the dam to be completed, it made only
modest changes to the law, preserving the statute's strong protection
for endangered species and their ecosystems4 3 Since then the ESA
has had a significant impact on water management in several places,
particularly where federal water projects have a major effect on
protected species and their ecosystems. 4

38 328 U.S. at 164.
39 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
40 The ESA's purposes are found in section 1531(b), which refers first to conserving the
ecosystems on which listed species depend, and second to conserving the species
themselves. Id. § 153 1(b).
41 See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
42 Id. at 174.
43 See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow Escapefor a Broad New
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109, 132 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus
eds. 2005).
44 See Reed D. Benson, Avoiding Jeopardy, Without the Questions: Recovery
Implementation Programsfor Endangered Species in Western River Basins, 2 MICH J.
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 473, 484-504 (2013) (describing the ESA's impact on water project
operations in various river basins).
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C. The Silverback: FederalOversight to ProtectNationalInterests
Interstate water allocation is perhaps the most obvious area where
federal law and a federal forum for resolving disputes are necessary to
ensure that an individual state does not promote its own interests at
the expense of another state. Today this point is well accepted, even
obvious, but in the early twentieth century it was a contested question
of law. A threshold issue in the original Kansas v. Colorado case
regarding the Arkansas River was whether the U.S. Supreme Court
even had jurisdiction over such an action.45 Having resolved that
question, the Court still had to determine whether federal law applied.
Colorado and its water users argued that a state had absolute control
over all the water within its boundaries and could allocate that water
entirely for its own uses even if that left none for a downstream
state. 46 The Court held that federal law must apply where "the action
of one State reaches through the agency of natural laws into the
territory of another State," and established the fundamental principle
of equitable apportionment of interstate waters.47 Undeterred,
Colorado made the same argument in a later case involving the
Laramie River,48 but the Court again rejected it because it had already
been "adjudged untenable." 4 9
Interstate waters, especially in the West, have been allocated
largely through compacts. 5 0 Because each compact is a negotiated

45 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 81-84 (1907).
46 They also argued that each state had absolute control over its natural resources, and
that federal involvement in interstate waters would undermine that control. Id. at 78-79.
Colorado's water users, especially the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company, seem to have
pressed this argument harder than Colorado itself. Colorado's main contention was that its
use of the Arkansas River was not causing harm to Kansas. Id. at 62-64. On this issue, the
Court found that Kansas was in fact being harmed, but that its injuries were relatively
minor and localized, and denied relief on that basis. Id. at 112-18.
47 Id. at 97-98. Although Kansas lost this case, the Court stated that Kansas could
return if Colorado increased its depletions to Kansas' detriment, "to the extent of
destroying the equitable apportionment of benefits between the two States resulting from
the flow of the river." Id. at 118.
48 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
49 Id. at 466. The Court noted that it had rejected this same argument in the Arkansas
River litigation. Id. ("Further consideration satisfies us that the ruling was right.").
50 As of 2007 there were twenty-six interstate water compacts, mostly involving
western states. Jerome C. Muys, George William Sherk & Marilyn C. O'Leary, Utton
Transboundary Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact, 47 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 17,21 (2007).
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agreement between the states that share an interstate water body,51
compacts might be seen as a means for states to control their own
destinies and minimize the risk of federal "interference" in water
management. However, that view is somewhat misleading because
compacts have significant federal dimensions. Most fundamentally,
Congress must approve each compact before it may take effect, which
is not automatic; 52 once approved, the compact becomes a federal
statute.5 3 In addition, compacts typically contain provisions
disclaiming any effects on the water rights of Indian tribes, the United
States or its "agencies or instrumentalities," 54 recognizing that federal
law may provide water rights for tribal and federal lands under the
Winters doctrine.55 Moreover, compacts are typically enforced in the
Supreme Court, which often solicits input from the U.S. government
on whether to accept a case and on the merits of the dispute. 56 With
several interstate water disputes currently pending before the Supreme
Court, three of them involving compacts, 57 it is clear that the federal
forum remains crucial even where states have agreed to a compact.

51 The Supreme Court emphasized the negotiated agreement element of interstate water
compacts in its recent decision in Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct.
2120, 2130 (2013).
52 For example, Congress never ratified the Truckee River Compact. John Kramer,
Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River, and Pyramid Lake: The Past, Present, and Future of
Interstate Water Issues, 19 PAC. L.J. 1339, 1340 (1988) (noting that the Truckee River
Compact, approved by California and Nevada, "languished before Congress for fourteen
years before hearings in 1985 and 1986 demonstrated that the consent and approval of
Congress could not be obtained").
53 See Tarrant, 133 S. Ct. at 2130 n.8.
54 See, e.g., Rio Grande Compact, ch. 155, art. XVI, 53 Stat. 785, 792 (1939) (no effect
on U.S. obligations to Indian tribes, or impairment of tribal rights); Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, chs. 47-48, art. XIX(a), (c), 63 Stat. 31, 42 (1949) (no effect on
"obligations of the United States of America to Indian tribes," or on "rights or powers of
the United States of America, its agencies or instrumentalities, in or to the waters of the
Upper Colorado River System, or its capacity to acquire rights in and to the use of said
waters"); Yellowstone River Compact, ch. 629, arts. VI & XVI(a), 65 Stat. 663, 668, 670
(1951) (no effect on tribal rights or federal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or capacity to acquire
water rights).
55 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
56 See generally John B. Draper & Jeffrey J. Wechsler, Gunboats on the Colorado:
Interstate Water Controversies, Past and Present, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1,
§ 18.02(3)(a) (2009).
57 The pending cases were brought by Kansas (on the Republican River Compact),
Montana (on the Yellowstone River Compact), and Texas (on the Rio Grande Compact).
The other interstate case in the Supreme Court involves the Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint system in the Southeast, where there is no current compact.
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In the context of tribal reserved rights, the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of federal oversight of state courts, even as
it handed the states a major victory in allowing them to adjudicate
tribal water right claims. The Court decided in 1976 that a federal
statute (the "McCarran Amendment") 5 8 established a strong
Congressional policy of having a single proceeding, often in state
court, to determine all water right claims (including federal and tribal)
for a single river basin. 59 In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of
Arizona,60 the Court recognized potentially serious problems with
having state courts adjudicate tribal claims, 6 but insisted that tribal
rights would nonetheless be protected. For one thing, federal law
would continue to govern tribal water claims, which state courts
"have a solemn obligation to follow. ' '62 "Moreover, any state-court

decision alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal
law can expect to receive, if brought for review before this Court, a
particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful
in safeguarding those rights from state
federal interest
63
encroachment."
In the regulatory context, Congress has repeatedly established
national programs for addressing environmental problems by
allowing states to implement federal standards, subject to federal
agency oversight. 64 The Clean Air Act offers a clear illustration: it
requires the EPA to set national standards for air quality, 65 calls on
states to ensure attainment of those standards through "State
67
66
Implementation Plans,", but requires EPA approval of such plans.
58 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2012).
59 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 820-21 (1976).
60 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
61 Id. at 566-69.

62 Id. at 571.
63 Id. However, the Supreme Court's interest in actually protecting tribal water rights
has been questioned, in light of its handling of the challenge to the Wyoming Supreme
Court's decision on the water rights of the Wind River Reservation. See generally Andrew
C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v.
United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1997).
64 See Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from
Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalismfor Recovery Under the Endangered
Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 78-79 (2002) (summarizing the important roles
given to states in implementing federal pollution control law, and describing this approach

as cooperative federalism).
65 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012).
66 Id. § 7410.

67 Id. § 7410(k).
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The Safe Drinking Water Act 6 8 provides another example, directing
69
the EPA to develop national standards for drinking water quality;
allowing a state to take over primary responsibility for enforcing these
standards if EPA determines that its laws and institutions are
adequate; 70 and authorizing the EPA to file its own enforcement
71
action if a state fails to respond adequately to the EPA's direction.
In the water context, however, the best-known example
of this
72
approach is the Clean Water Act, as explained below.
In summary, the importance of the federal role in water
management is shown by the greenback, the humpback, and the
silverback; that is, the federal government is an important player
because of its singular capacity to address major challenges by
spending big money, by setting and protecting national priorities, and
by providing a necessary check on state actions. The next Part
examines how Congress has applied these principles, while providing

important roles for state laws and institutions, in two distinctly
different eras of federal water policy.
II
Two WAVES OF FEDERAL WATER POLICY: DIFFERING GOALS,
SIMILAR ELEMENTS

The twehtieth century brought two well-recognized waves of
federal water poliCy 73 : water project development and environmental
68 Id. §§ 300fto 300j-26.
69 Id. § 300g-l.
70 Id. § 300g-2.
71 Id. § 300g-3.
72 See infra notes 111-34 and accompanying text.
73 In a recent book looking at issues of water management in nations with federal
systems, noted water scholar Andrea Gerlak identified four "streams" of U.S. water policy
beginning in 1900. Andrea K. Gerlak, Federalism in US Water Policy, in FEDERAL
RIVERS: MANAGING WATER INMULTI-LAYERED POLITICAL SYSTEMS 41, 43-48 (Dustin
Garrick et al. eds., 2014). The titles and periods she identified for these streams were:
Federal Development and Dominance (1900-1960), Development Doubts and
Environmental Concerns (1960s to 1980s), Devolution and Penny-Pinching (1980s), and
Restoration and Collaboration (1990s-present). Id. Gerlak's four "streams" may provide a
more complete and nuanced view of twentieth century water policy than my two "waves,"
and she is correct in suggesting that environmental protection has been a lower priority (at
least for Congress) since the 1980s. However, I have simplified twentieth century federal
water policy into two overlapping eras because each of these two eras has left a legacy that
remains largely in place today: federally operated water projects (operated mostly by
Reclamation and the Corps) and federal environmental laws (such as the Clean Water Act
and ESA).
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protection. The first wave, which emphasized dam construction,
lasted into the 1970s;7 4 the second wave, which focused on river
conservation and water quality regulation, began in the 1960s.75
Given their sharply different goals, and the common understanding
that the rise of environmental concerns helped bring an end to the
76
dam-building era, one might think that these two waves of federal
water policy were nothing alike. However, the two waves-and
especially their 'flagship programs-had some fundamental and
important similarities.
A. The First Wave: Dam Construction and the 1902 Reclamation Act
Once Congress decided that impounding rivers was good and
important work for the U.S. government, 7 7 it directed several
agencies to pursue water project development. The Federal Power Act
of 192078 established the Federal Power Commission (now the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC) and directed it to
issue licenses for hydropower projects on navigable waters. 79 The
Army Corps of Engineers built hundreds of projects on rivers across
the country, primarily for flood control; its string of six large dams on
the Missouri River, authorized in 1944 under the Pick-Sloan Plan,8 0
represent the largest system of reservoirs on any U.S. river.8 1 The
New Deal era Tennessee Valley Authority8 2 built more than four
dozen reservoirs in seven southeastern states, largely for hydropower
74 See Pisani, supranote 16, at 625.
75 See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal
Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 14-17
(2001).
76 Id.; see also Pisani, supra note 16, at 625.
77 Reisner describes the origins of federal dam building by Reclamation and the Corps
in terms that often reflect as poorly on Congress as on the agencies. REISNER, supra note
20, at 115-20 (Reclamation); id. at 179-82 (Corps).
78 The 1920 statute was originally called the Federal Water Power Act. Federal Water
Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920). Since amended and expanded many times, the
Federal Power Act is now codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 792 to 825r.
79Id. §§ 1, 4. One of the more important Supreme Court decisions on federal authority
over water involved FERC's hydropower licensing program. United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
80 The Supreme Court summarized the history of Pick-Sloan and the 1944 statute in
ETSIPipelineProject v. Missouri,484 U.S. 495, 500-05 (1988).
81John H. Davidson, Marketing Missouri River Water: Competing Plans for
Commoditizing a Natural Resource, 89 N.D. L. REv. 1, 3 (2013).
82 A rather self-congratulatory history appears on the TVA website. From the New Deal
to a New Century, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., http://www.tva.com/abouttva/history.htm (last
visited Aug. 8, 2014).
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and economic development. 83 But the original federal dam-building
program was launched by the 1902 Reclamation Act; 84 under this
statute and later enactments, 85 Reclamation built
of projects
• -. hundreds
86
in seventeen western states, primarily for irrigation.
In the original Reclamation Act, Congress established the
Reclamation Fund8 7 and authorized the Interior Department to use the
money
• •• to 88build and operate projects to store and deliver water for
irrigation.
These projects would supply water to private farmers,
who were required to live on or near the irrigated land and were
limited to irrigating no more than 160 acres. 89 Farmers receiving
water from a project would be responsible for repaying the
government for the costs of building that project, interest free, within
ten years. 9° Over the years, Congress expanded the purposes of
Reclamation projects, relaxed the repayment terms, and eventually
raised the acreage cap on farms eligible for project water. 9 I For
purposes of this Article, however, three basic elements of the program
have remained consistent.
First, the Reclamation program has always represented a major
federal investment in water development, by which water is delivered
at a substantial subsidy. While this subsidy was originally rather
modest-essentially a ten-year, interest-free loan to farmers receiving
project water-it soon grew to the point where irrigators commonly

83 See Frequently Asked Questions About TVA, TENN. VALLEY AUTH., http://www.tva
.com/abouttva/keyfacts.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
84 Act bf June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in scattered sections of 43
U.S.C. §§ 371-498 (2012)),
85 The Reclamation program has long proceeded under two types of statutes: those that
provide authority and direction for the program as a whole and those that pertain to a
particular project, location, or activity. See generally Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of
the Old Bureau: Modern-Day Reclamation Statutes and Congress's Unfinished
EnvironmentalBusiness, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 137, 140-67 (2011) (examining both sitespecific enactments and programmatic statutes relating to Reclamation since 2000).
86 Id. at 140 n.16.
87 The Reclamation Fund was established in Section 1 of the 1902 Act, codified at 43
U.S.C. § 391.
88 Id. Section 2 of the 1902 Act authorized the Interior Department to construct
irrigation projects; as amended, it is now codified at 43 U.S.C. § 411.
89 These requirements, since repealed, were set out in Section 5 of the 1902 Act, 32
Stat. at 389.
90 This long-gone requirement appeared in Section 4 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 389.
91 See Benson, supra note 85, at 159-60.
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repaid only a minor fraction of project

costs. 9 2

While opinions differ

on whether the federal investment in irrigation has been sound policy,
there is no question that taxpayers have shouldered much of the
burden of storing and delivering water to western farmers. 93

Second, the Reclamation program has worked within the water
rights systems of the western states. Section 8 of the 1902
Reclamation Act not only recognized state laws "relating to the

control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation,"
but also required the Interior Department to "proceed in conformity
with such laws" in implementing the program. 94 This provision

remains on the books, and in 1978, a divided Supreme Court
interpreted Section 8 to allow states to impose conditions on federal

water projects so long as those conditions
are "not inconsistent" with
95

relevant congressional directives.
Third, Congress has always placed important requirements and
restrictions on the Reclamation program that are both general and
project specific. The original 1902 Act, for example,• -•authorized
the
96
reclamation program for the single purpose of irrigation;
imposed
acreage and residency restrictions on farmers who could receive
project water;97 fixed the terms for repayment of project costs; 98 and
specified that even after repayment was completed, "title to and the
management and operation of the reservoirs and the works necessary
for their protection and operation shall remain- in the Government
until otherwise provided by Congress." 99 Congress would later revise
the program to require that repayment contracts be made with districts

92 1996 GAO REPORT, supra note 19, 15-22 (describing forms of subsidies provided to
irrigators receiving water from Reclamation projects).
93 According to the, 1996 GAO Report, as of 1994, the federal government has spent
nearly $22 billion on Reclamation projects, of which $16.8 billion was considered
"reimbursable" by project beneficiaries. Id. at 23. Of that total, $7.1 billion had been
allocated to irrigation, but irrigators were required to repay only $3.4 billion and had
actually repaid less than $1 billion. Id.
94 Most of Section 8 of the 1902 Act is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 383.
95 California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674 (1978).
96 Section 2 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 388, authorized the Interior Department to
construct "irrigation works."
97 Section 5 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 389, established these restrictions.
98 Section 4 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 389, provided for repayment of construction
costs by project irrigators over a ten-year period.
99 Section 6 of the 1902 Act, 32 Stat. at 389, contained this proviso, which is codified at
43 U.S.C. § 498.
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rather than individual farmers,
expand the program to include
municipal and industrial water supply,10 ' and require conservation
plans from those entities with contracts for project water. 102 In
addition, project-specific statutes would address such matters as the
authorized uses of project water and even the types of crops that could
be grown with it.' 0 3 Thus, despite the general statement of deference
to state law in Section 8, Congress has established numerous
conditions on the Reclamation program and individual projects,
reflecting the federal policy of the day.
B. The Second Wave. EnvironmentalProtection and the 1972 Clean
Water Act
In the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted several laws with the
potential to restrict development and use of water resources. For
example, the 1968. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act designated river
segments that would then be protected from water project
development, among other things.
The National Environmental
Policy Act, 0 5 Sometimes called the "Magna Carta" of U.S.
environmental laws, 10 6 required a detailed environmental analysis
before a federal agency could permit, fund, or take any action that
could have significant environmental impacts.' ° 7 In addition, the
100 Act of May 25, 1926, ch. 383, § 46, 44 Stat. 636, 649 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 423e (2012)).
101 Reclamation Project Act of 1939, ch. 418, § 9(c), 53 Stat. 1187, 1194 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c)) (providing for forty-year repayment contracts, with
interest, for municipal water supply or "miscellaneous purposes," provided that such
contracts do not interfere with irrigation).
102 Congress established this requirement in the Reclamation Reform Act of 182, Pub.
L. No. 97-293, § 210, 96 Stat. 1261, 1268 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 390jj).
103 For example, in authorizing the San Angelo Project in Texas, Congress not only
specified project purposes (including "irrigation of approximately ten thousand acres of
land in Tom Green County"), but also provided that no project water could be used to
grow surplus crops for the first ten years. Act of Aug. 16, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-152, §§ 1,
2(d), 71 Stat. 372, 372-73 (1957).
104 Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1271-1287 (2012)). The statutory protection from water project development is found
at 16 U.S.C. § 1278.
105 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat, 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370f (2012)).
106 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE NEPA: HAVING YOUR
VOICE HEARD 2 (2007).
107 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). Although the statute is certainly not specific to water, one of
the primary factors motivating some members of Congress in enacting NEPA was reining
in the federal "mission" agencies, such as the Corps, that were intent on building
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ESA 0 8 established powerful protections for animal and. plant species
threatened with extinction.' 0 9 However, the Clean Water Act" o is the
most ambitious environmental law specific to water.
Although Congress had previously enacted measures aiming to
reduce water pollution, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972.1 dramatically increased federal involvement
in water quality protection.' 12 The Clean Water Act begins with a
sweeping objective "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters, ' 3 and establishes
lofty national goals for cutting pollution discharges and attaining
water quality by the mid-1980s." The law prohibits any person from
discharging pollutants to water except in compliance with specified
provisions of the statute; 1 15 directs the EPA to develop technologybased "effluent
limitations" for discharge of pollutants from point
116
sources;
and sets up separate permitting programs for the discharge
of pollutants into water (under section 402) 117 and the discharge of
dredged or fill material (under section 404). 118 In addition to
restricting pollutant discharges, the Clean Water Act requires states to
set standards that protect the quality of individual water bodies," 9

environmentally harmful projects. A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court
Construes the NationalEnvironmental PolicyAct to Create a Powerful Cause ofAction, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77, 85-88 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus eds.,
2005).
108Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (2012)).
109 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
110 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012).
III Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
112 "[D]espite the prominent roles Congress left for the states, the 1972 Act was a
congressional statement of the need for a greater federal role in water quality regulation.
. . . [U]nder the new statute, water quality regulation was subject to extensive federal
oversight for the first time." Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism
and Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 33 ENVTL. L. 113, 124 (2003).
113 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
114 Id. § 1251(a)(1)-(2).
115 Id. § 1311 (a). The statute defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source," and "point source" as "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance ... from which pollutants are or may be
discharged." Id. § 1362(12), (14). "Pollutant" is broadly defined to include a wide range of
materials, plus heat. Id. § 1362(6).
116 Id. § 1311 (b). "Point source" is defined in the prior footnote.
117 Id. § 1342(a).
118Id. § 1344(a).
119

Id. § 1313(c)(2).
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subject to EPA oversight. 10 Finally, the statute provides for both
federal grants and loans to construct publicly owned wastewater
treatment plants. 121
The Clean Water Act shares three big-picture similarities with the
Reclamation program. First, Congress has delivered sizable federal
infrastructure subsidies through grant and loan programs for
wastewater treatment works. According to the EPA, the current Clean
Water State Revolving Fund program has delivered more than $100
billion to finance wastewater infrastructure over the past twenty-plus
years, providing more than 33,000 low-interest loans; 12 2 an earlier
federal grant program for wastewater infrastructure had provided
more than $41 billion in federal spending through 1984, making it
"the largest nonmilitary public works program[] since the Interstate
Highway System." 123 By funding these grants and loans, Congress
has effectuated the "national policy that Federal financial assistance
1 24
be provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment works.,
Second, the Clean Water Act reflects Congress' recognition of the
states' lead role in allocating water. Most specifically, section 101(g)
states "the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired" by the Clean Water
12 5
Act, and state water rights shall not be superseded or abrogated.
More generally, section 510 declares that the statute does not affect
"any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters
(including boundary waters) of such States."' 1 26 In addition to these
statements, the Clean Water Act allows the states to exercise
important regulatory authorities, such as setting quality standards for
their water bodies, 12 7 certifying that certain federally licensed or
120 Id. § 1313(c)(3).
121 See id. §§ 1281-1301 (construction grants for publicly owned treatment works); id.
§§ 1381-1387 (state water pollution control revolving funds).
122 Clean Water State Revolving Fund, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa
.gov/grantsjfunding/cwsrf/cwsrfindex.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2014).
123 CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCING: HISTORY OF EPA APPROPRIATIONS 1(2012).
124 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4).
125 Id. § 1251(g). The third and final sentence of "the Wallop Amendment" requires
federal agencies to "co-operate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive
solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing
water resources." Id.
126 Id. § 1370.
127 Id. § 1313(c)(2).
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and issuing

permits for the discharge
of pollutants at industrial outfalls and other
"point sources."1 29
Third, Congress designed the Clean Water Act to promote national
goals of restoring and protecting water quality and gave the EPA
power to set standards and oversee state activities to ensure progress
toward those goals. For example, although states set water quality
standards under section 303, the EPA must review each standard for
consistency with the statute, order changes if necessary, and set the
standard itself if the state refuses to make the required changes. 130
Although states can get EPA approval to issue pollutant discharge
permits under section 402, they must notify the EPA of each permit
they propose to issue, and the EPA can raise objections and issue the
permit itself if the state does not resolve them. 131 Section 510, titled
"Stdte Authority," allows states to adopt and enforce their own water
pollution control standards, but only ifthey are no less stringent than
applicable federal standards. 32 In short, the Clean Water Act gives
states significant powers and duties in controlling pollution, 133 but
also directs the EPA to ensure that they adequately serve the national
interest in restoring and protecting water quality.
C. Comparingthe First Two Waves: Obvious Differences, Important
Similarities
At first glance, the Reclamation laws and the Clean Water Act are
only similar in that they are both federal statutes relating to water.
One deals with water quantity and use, the other with water
quality. 134 The former authorized a public works program carried out
128 Id. § 1341(a).
129 Id. § 1342(b). States must gain EPA approval to operate this permitting program,
but such approval is required if a state demonstrates that it meets nine statutory criteria. Id.
130Id. § 1313(c)(3).
131 Id. § 1342(d).
132 Id. § 1370(1).

133 Section 1251(b) also states "the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution... " Id. § 125 1(b).
134 In a notable case upholding the state of Washington's use of its Clean Water Act
authority to require a new hydropower project to maintain adequate in-stream flows for
fish habitats, the Supreme Court rejected an argument to the effect
that the Clean Water Act is only concerned with water "quality," and does not
allow the regulation of water "quantity." This is an artificial distinction. In many
cases, water quantity is closely related to water quality; a sufficient lowering of
the water quantity in a body of water could destroy all of its designated uses ....
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by the Interior Department, the latter a regulatory program run by the
Environmental Protection Agency. The reclamation laws make water
available for beneficial use, to promote economic development; the
Clean Water Act requires water pollution controls that impose
restrictions and costs on economic activities. The 1902 Act sought to
dam and divert western rivers in service of human productivity,
whereas the 1972 Act sought to restore and maintain the integrity of
the nation's waters. Philosophically, these laws could hardly be more
different.
However, in significant respects the Reclamation laws and the
Clean Water Act took similar approaches in addressing their
respective challenges. As explained above, both delivered major
federal investments in important water infrastructure. Both recognized
state primacy in water allocation and provided important roles for
state laws and institutions. And both specified key national
priorities-such as the farm acreage limits of the Reclamation
program and the point source pollution controls under the Clean
Water Act-that would override any conflicting state law.
The unexpected similarities of the 1902 Reclamation Act and the
Clean Water Act extend to some of the circumstances surrounding
their enactment. In considering both pieces of legislation, Congress
faced serious questions about whether it was appropriate to expand
the federal government's involvement with water. In the early 1900s,
the push for federal support of western irrigation was met with
concerns over whether building water projects was an appropriate
federal role, and whether a federal water development program would
interfere with state water allocation authority and water rights., 35 In
the early 1970s, many sharply criticized the proposed amendments to
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act under the rationale that
Congress3 6 should leave water allocation and regulation to state
control.'

PUD No. I of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 719 (1994).
135 DONALD J. PISANI, TO RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER, LAW, AND PUBLIC

POLICY 1848-1902, at 306 (1st ed. 1992) (noting "strong opposition" to a federal
Reclamation program by three senators "who opposed the creation of any bureau that
might threaten state administrative control over water"); id. at 309 (identifying specific
concerns of Rocky Mountain states and their allies over any federal program to build and
operate water projects).
136 See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based
Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10329, 10332-35 (1997)
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Given these strongly expressed concerns about the role of the
federal government in water development and regulation, what led to
the enactment of these statutes? In both cases, Congress perceived a
problem of national importance that, as a practical matter, local or
state governments were unlikely to resolve. With the 1902
Reclamation Act, Congress brought federal resources to bear in
building major water projects to store and deliver water for
irrigation-a challenge that had proved too great for the private sector
and even state governments in most areas of the nineteenth century
West. 137 A federal irrigation program for the West came to be viewed
as a national imperative, even an obligation, providing necessary
support for regional development where-the U.S. government had
sought to draw settlers.13 8 As for the Clean Water Act, the
"environmental decade" of the 1970s saw a groundswell of pressure
for national action to combat the growing problem of water
pollution-a matter that Congress first addressed in 1948, but had
largely left to the states. 139 W/hile many states, along with industrial
and business interests, argued against federal limits on water
pollution, the Clean Water Act showed that Congress saw water
quality as a national priority that only national action could
address. 140
Thus, the 1902 Reclamation Act and 1972 Clean Water Act
became the law of the land despite strong concerns that they would
bring too much federal involvement in water matters that the states.
(providing extensive quotes from opponents of a greater federal role in water quality
regulation).
137 PISANI, supra note 135, at 104-18 (describing the general failure of large-scale
private irrigation enterprises); id. at 251-65 (describing the failure of the federal Carey
Act, which sought to promote development of irrigation projects supported by the western
states).
138 See id. at 318-25 (describing arguments in favor of the 1902 Reclamation Act by
legislative proponents and President Roosevelt).
139 Houck, supra note 136, at 10331-32 (noting the push for federal water quality
protection and summarizing the 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act and 1965 Water

Quality Act).
140 For example, the acting chair of a congressional committee lashed out at critics of
federal water quality legislation at a 1971 hearing on the subject:
We left it to the States, year after year, and we didn't get a single thing but a
bunch of nursery rhymes as to the Constitution , and we didn't get any clean
water until the Federal Government insisted upon it and made some dollars
available to the State for that use.
Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971:Hearings on H.R. 11895 and H.R. 11896
Before the H. Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 273 (1971) (statement of Rep. Robert E.
Jones, Member, H. Comm. on Public Works).
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regarded as their business. Nonetheless, Congress acted to tackle
major national problems that were too important and too challenging
to leave unaddressed by the states. In adopting these laws, Congress
preserved significant roles for state governments and state laws, but
also established key national policies for water development and
environmental protection and backed those policies with a serious
investment of federal dollars. Thus, these landmark lawsrepresenting two distinctly different waves of federal water policy-,
have common themes in their origin stories and their approaches. The
next Part suggests that Congress could return to this approach as the
West faces increasingly serious water management challenges in an
era of over-allocation and climate change.
III
SERIOUS PROBLEMS, EXPENSIVE SOLUTIONS: WHY THE WEST COULD
USE A THIRD WAVE

Given the usual fear and loathing surrounding the federal
government's involvement in water issues, one might expect to find
little demand for new federal legislation or spending on water
resource matters. The passage of the WRRDA in 2014,141 which
astonishingly won nearly unanimous approval in Congress, suggests
otherwise. Skeptics might argue that the WRRDA focused on
navigation, flood control, and other core Corps functions and had
little to do with water supply issues or the West. But that is not an
entirely accurate picture, because the WRRDA does include
important provisions relating to water supply, largely focused on the
West. 142 Beyond the WRRDA, however, the likely demand for new
141See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
142Section 1046 of the WRRDA, titled "Reservoir Operations and Water Supply,"
requires the Corps to assess "management practices, priorities, and authorized purposes at
Corps of Engineers reservoirs in arid regions to determine the effects of such practices,
priorities, and purposes on water supply during periods of drought"; as part of this
assessment, the Corps must "identify actions that can be carried out within the scope of
existing authorities of the Secretary to increase project flexibility for the purpose of
mitigating drought impacts." Pub. L. No. 113-121, § 1046(a), 128 Stat. 1193, 1251 (2014).
This section also prohibits the Corps from charging a fee over the next ten years for
contracts to receive "surplus" water from Upper Missouri mainstem reservoirs. Id.
§ 1046(c), 128 Stat. at 1254. For background on the purposes of this provision, which
relates to energy development in North Dakota, see Davidson, supra note 81, at 15-17.
Perhaps most remarkably, Section 4008, titled "Rural Western Water," authorizes the
Corps to provide "design and construction assistance for water-related environmental
infrastructure and resource protection and development in Idaho, Montana, rural Nevada,
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federal involvement in western water is apparent from a bill that
Congress enacted in 2009, from recent activity on Capitol Hill, and
from the looming, enormous challenges facing western river basins
and water managers. This Part briefly examines some of these factors
that suggest interest in new federal water initiatives and considers
their implications for future federal water policy.
A. The 2009 Public Lands (and Water) Bill
When Congress passed the giant Omnibus Public Land
Management Act of 2009,143 it included numerous provisions dealing
with water in the West. These provisions are diverse, and some do not
fit neatly into a single category, but on the whole theyS reflect
an
144
emphasis on three areas: (1) authorizing new water projects,
more
than a dozen in all, such as the Tumalo Irrigation District Water
Conservation Project in Oregon, 145 the Eastern New Mexico Rural
Water Supply System Project,14 6 and the Riverside-Corona Feeder
Project in California's Bunker Hill Groundwater Basin; 14 7 (2)
authorizing and funding environmental restoration programs of a
more or less collaborative nature, including endangered fish recovery
programs in the Upper Colorado and San Juan River Basins, 148 the
"Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program,"' 4 9 and
a program to restore flows and salmon to the San Joaquin River under
the terms of a court-approved settlement; 150 and (3) supporting tribal
New Mexico, rural Utah, and Wyoming," which may include "water supply and related
facilities," and "surface water resource protection and development." Id. § 4008, 128 Stat.
at 1316. A similar authorization in the Water Resources Development Act of 1999 had
been limited to Montana and rural Nevada. Pub. L. No. 106-53, § 595, 113 Stat. 269, 383
(1999). Congress also authorized a Rural Water Supply program within Reclamation in
2006. See Benson, supra note 85, at 162-63.
143 Pub. L. No. 111-11, 123 Stat. 991 (2009).
144 Congress also addressed existing water projects, however, through an "Aging
Infrastructure" provision dealing with inspections and maintenance of older Reclamation
project facilities, for purposes of protecting public safety. Id. §§ 9601-9605, 123 Stat. at
1346-49.
145 Id. § 9101, 123 Stat. at 1298.
146 [d. § 9103, 123 Stat. at 1300-03.
147 Id. § 9112, 123 Stat. at 1318-19.
148 Id. § 9107, 123 Stat. at 1309-10. The Upper Colorado and San Juan endangered fish

programs were the original Recovery Implementation Programs, or RIPs, designed to
balance the habitat needs of endangered fish with water use and development activities.
For an explanation of these and other RIPs, see Benson, supra note 44, at 505-23.
149Id. §§ 9401-9404, 123 Stat. at 1327-29. For a brief explanation of this program on
the Lower Colorado River, see Benson, supra note 44, at 502-04.
150Id. §§ 10001-10203, 123 Stat. at 1349-67.
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water settlements by approving the Navajo Nation settlement in New
52
Mexico' 5 1 and the Duck Valley Reservation settlement in Idaho,'
and by establishing a new Reclamation Water Settlements Fund to
help ensure that future funding would be available for approved tribal
water settlements.1 53 This 2009 bill also included the SECURE Water
Act, by which Congress authorized a grant program for purposes such
as conserving water, promoting markets, and providing habitats for
imperiled species;' 54 it further directed Reclamation to study the
potential impacts of climate change on water resources
in the West
55
and to develop strategies for mitigating those impacts.'
B. Recent CongressionalActivity
The 1 13th Congress saw several requests for new federal authority
and funding to address water-related challenges in the West. Drought
relief has been a top priority, as the House and Senate passed
competing, and sharply divergent bills to address problems in parched
California.' 56 While California has grabbed the headlines, other
drought relief legislation has also been introduced, including a
measure specifically for New Mexico,1 57 a bill to reauthorize
Reclamation's drought relief program for all the western states,'58
and a "Water in the 21st Century Act" that would promote drought
preparedness and resilience through a variety of new and expanded
programs. 159 Another legislative push has involved the Klamath River
151Id.§§ 10601-10704, 123 Stat. at 1379-1405.
152 Id.§§ 10801-10809, 123 Stat. at 1405-14.
153Id.§ 10501, 123 Stat. at 1375-79. Although money from this fund is not technically
limited to tribal water settlements, the statute prioritizes certain tribal settlements in New
Mexico, Montana, and Arizona. Id. § 10501(c)(2)-(3), 123 Stat. at 1376.
154 The statute authorized the Interior Secretary to provide grants and make cooperative
agreements with "any eligible applicant to assist the eligible applicant in planning,
designing, or constructing any improvement" for a range of purposes. Id. § 9504(a)(1), 123
Stat. at 1334.
155Id. § 9503(b), 123 Stat. at 1332-33.
156 A Congressional Research Service report provides a useful summary of the two bills
and their vastly disparate provisions. PERVAZE A. SHEIKH, BETSY A. CODY & CHARLES
V. STERN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL RESPONSE TO DROUGHT IN CALIFORNIA:
AN ANALYSIS OF S.2198 AND H.R. 3964 (July 17, 2014). House and Senate negotiators
were unable to agree on California drought legislation in the 113th Congress, but the two
sides have not given up efforts to find a compromise. Debra Kahn & Nick Juliano,
DroughtBill Negotiations 'Hot and Heavy-Feinstein, E&E DAILY (Jan. 8, 2015).
157 New Mexico Drought Relief Act of 2014, S.2470, 113th Cong. (2014).
158S.659, 113th Cong. (2013).
159 Water in the 21st Century Act, H.R. 5363, S.2771, 113th Cong. (2014).

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93, 685

Basin in Oregon and California, where diverse players have
negotiated a series of agreements to resolve that basin'.s longstanding
1 60
conflicts over water for irrigation, wildlife refuges, and fisheries;
Oregon's senators have introduced a bill to provide authority and
funding to implement these agreements, 161 at an expected federal cost
of $500 million. 162 On a third front, the Western Governors
Association and the Native American Rights Fund submitted joint
written testimony' 63 to a Senate appropriations subcommittee
regarding federal funding for negotiating and implementing tribal
water settlements; the testimony concluded by stating that failure to
provide sufficient funding for this purpose "will only increase federal
costs, perpetuate hardship to tribes, and prolong resolution of
conflicts between reserved water rights and state-created water rights.
This, in turn, could potentially disrupt established economies and
hinder effective state and regional water planning and
development. ' ' 164 These events show that the West still seeks federal
action and .federal money to help resolve its biggest (and most
expensive) water problems.
C. Future Water Supply Shortfalls
Looking ahead, the American West will see water management
challenges even greater and more fundamental than the big ones it
faces today. Perhaps the most famous and most difficult of these
challenges is the looming shortfall of water supplies in the Colorado
River Basin.' 6 5 According to a 2012 study by Reclamation, the gap
160 For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of Klamath River Basin water issues, see
HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN (2008).
161Klamath Basin Water Recovery and Economic Restoration Act of 2014, S. 2379,

113th Cong. (2014).
162 At a hearing on the Senate bill, an aide to former Oregon governor John Kitzhaber
stated that the negotiated agreements had helped bring stability to the basin, but that "this
stability will not last unless Congress acts now to authorize federal participation in these

agreements . . . . The basin has done its part to overcome conflict, now it is time for
Congress to do the same and pass S. 2379." California/Oregon/KlamathBasin, 2090 W.
STATES WATER COUNCIL (May 23, 2014), available at http://www.westemstateswater.org
/wp-content/uploads/2012/1I/NEWS-2090.pdf (quoting Richard Whitman, Natural
Resources Policy Director to Governor Kitzhaber, at a hearing of the Senate Energy and
Natural Resources Committee, Water and Power Subcommittee, June 3, 2014).
163 Senate Appropriations/indian Water Rights, 2088 W. STATES WATER COUNCIL
(May 23, 2014), available at http://www.westernstateswater.org/wp-content/uploads/2012
/1 /NEWS-2088.pdf.
164 Id.
165 The water woes of the Colorado River Basin brought a front-page story in The New
York Times, indicating the national significance of the problem. See Michael Wines,
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between water supply and demand in the basin will grow to an annual
average of 3.2 million acre-feet (MAF) by 2060.'66 That projection is
daunting enough, but the actual shortfall is quite likely to be worse,
given that the 3.2 MAF average probably underestimates the impact
of climate change. 167 And the Colorado River Basin is not alone in
facing a major gap between water supply and demand. Another
Reclamation study estimated that the Lower Rio Grande Basin would
face an average annual water supply shortfall of around two-thirds of
a million acre-feet by 2060.168 Nor are such challenges limited to the
Southwest. For example, irrigation water shortages in northern
Montana's Milk River Basin, which already average 71,000 acre-feet
annually, may worsen by approximately 50% by 2050 due to changes
in runoff and increases in crop water demands.' 6 9 In addition, the
Milk River Basin may see increasing stress on water supplies
because
70
of environmental, recreational, and tribal water demands. 1
What do these legislative efforts and predicted shortfalls portend
for the future role of the federal government in western water
matters? Most fundamentally, they suggest that-general principles or
philosophies aside-there is still significant interest in federal
assistance (namely, money) to help address stubborn water supply
problems, especially ones involving expensive infrastructure or
restoration projects. That interest is likely to grow over tine, as
climate change and population growth combine to make these
problems more frequent and more severe. Thus, pressure may build
over time for greater federal investment-and hence involvement-in
water solutions.
Colorado River Drought Forces a Painful Reckoning for States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2014,
at AI.
166 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2012).

167 This is true because the study analyzed four scenarios for future water supply in the
basin, but only one of those four accounted for the impacts of climate change. Id. at 6-7
(summarizing the four water supply scenarios, and noting that lower flows were expected
under the scenario accounting for climate change).
168 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
LOWER Rio GRANDE BASIN STUDY ES-4 (2013). One of the study's more disturbing
projections is that climate change could decrease the reliable annual yield of the FalconAmistad Reservoir system on the Rio Grande by about 40%. Id. at ES-12.
169 U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ST. MARY RIVER AND MILKRIVER BASINS STUDY SUMMARY REPORT 10-12 (2012).
170 Id. at 12-13. Further, construction of a new reservoir in the Canadian portion of this
international river basin would allow increased irrigation in Canada and exacerbate
shortages in Montana. Id. at 13.
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If and when Congress gets serious about addressing twenty-first
century water resource challenges, what might be the elements of a
new generation of federal water policy? The specifics are difficult to
predict, as they may depend on factors such as the location and
severity of droughts, legal conflicts over water shortages, and
congressional attitudes toward spending. But given Congress' track
record on water, recent demands for federal legislation and spending,
and the growing water challenge's facing the West, one can anticipate
the general principles and broad outlines of a potential "third wave"
of water policy at the federal level. 171
First, any new federal water policy will need to focus primarily on
a small number of key problems that implicate important federal
interests and that are unlikely to be resolved successfully without
federal involvement and investment. Addressing water needs in
Indian Country is one obvious priority, and tribal water settlements
have become the preferred vehicle for doing so; ensuring that future
settlements have the requisite funding may be crucial to the success of
negotiations. Aquatic ecosystems (especially for purposes of fish
habitat) are another federal priority, as expressed in the Clean Water
Act, the ESA, and various basin-specific measures such as the San
Joaquin provisions in the 2009 public lands bill.172 Environmental
restoration has been a particular priority in basins where native fish
populations have been hit hard by the construction and operation of
federal water projects, as illustrated by the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act 173 and by bipartisan congressional support for
endangered fish programs in the Upper Colorado and San Juan basins.
This last point suggests a third area-review of federal water project
operations-that could be an important focus of federal water policy
in the twenty-first century. The WRRDA directed the Corps to
develop plans for operational reviews of its projects; 174 the SECURE
Water Act suggested that Reclamation should consider revising
project operations as a climate change adaptation strategy.175
171Readers interested in more specific policy proposals should consider the ideas
offered by the professor and former Interior Solicitor John Leshy in a concise 2009 article.
John Leshy, Notes on a Progressive National Water Policy, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 133
(2009).
172 For a summary of several of the basin-specific measures, see Benson, supra note 85,
at 153-58.
173 Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XXXIV, 106 Stat. 4706, 4706-31 (1992).
174 Sse supra note 142.
175 Changes to reservoir operating guidelines were one of several potential strategies
that Congress directed Reclamation to consider in addressing the potential water impacts
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Congress could go further by requiring Reclamation to develop new,
long-term project operating plans, as it did explicitly for Glen Canyon
Dam in the Grand Canyon Protection Act. 176
Second, significant federal funding will be an essential component
to provide financial assistance and incentives for addressing targeted
problems. At a time when Congress is generally tight-fisted about
discretionary spending, this element may seem like a difficult sell.
But the near-unanimous enactment of the WRRDA, despite its eightfigure price tag, shows that even deficit hawks can be persuaded to
vote for serious water-related investments if the rationale and demand
are sufficiently strong. Some of the most compelling cases will
involve negotiated settlement agreements-like the current Klamath
Basin package' 77 or tribal water settlements-that promise to resolve
lengthy and costly litigation, eliminate uncertainty, and address
problems in a way that key interests can accept ...so long as the

federal government bears much of the financial cost. The Reclamation
Water Settlements Fund-created by Congress in 2009 in an effort to
guarantee future funding for specified tribal water settlements by
setting aside some money that would otherwise flow to the
Reclamation Fund 78-shows the importance of assuring funding for
such measures and suggests one source of potential federal dollars.
Third, the new federal water policy must continue to respect the
strong interests of states in allocating and managing water resources,
while ensuring that federal priorities are respected and protected.
Striking this balance is delicate and requires more than the standard
statutory "savings clause" purporting to preserve state authorities and
state-law water rights, 179 as such declarations do not necessarily carry
a great deal of weight.' While any federal water initiative is sure to
draw opposition on principle, a new program could prove politically

of climate change in the West. See Reed D. Benson, Federal Water Law and the "Double
Whammy ": How the Bureau of Reclamation Can Help the West Adapt to Drought and
Climate Change, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1049, 1058-61 (2012).
176 Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XVIII, 106 Stat. at 4669-73.
177 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
178 Pub. L. No. 111-11, § 10501, 123 Stat. 991, 1375 (2009) (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 407 (2012)).
179 Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, 43 U.SC. § 383, is a famous state-law
savings clause, and the Clean Water Act contains two such clauses in sections 101(g) and
510. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
180See Benson, supra note 10, at 295 (noting that Supreme Court interpretations of
such clauses have varied).
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acceptable if it involves a clearly defined and legitimate federal
interest, reserves meaningful roles for state laws and institutions, and
provides enough money to convince pragmatists that the benefits
would outweigh the baggage.
Finally, new federal water policy for the West must directly
address the serious problem of over-allocation facing many major
river basins, especially in the southern half of the region.
Overallocation is a problem that has become painfully evident in
California, 182 where the water needs of salmon, other endangered
species, and wildlife refuges have conflicted with irrigation demands,
. 183
especially as the ongoing drought has cut available supplies.
It is
increasingly clear on the Rio Grande, where 2014 saw new litigation
filed by Texas against New Mexico under the 1938 Compact, 84 as
well as a new ESA lawsuit seeking greater flows, enough to sustain
the last wild population of endangered silvery minnows. 185 And it is
inescapable in the Colorado River Basin, where current reservoir
levels have reached historic lows, 1 8 6 demands will likely be much
181The major basins in the northern half of the West-the Missouri and Columbia
basins-have their own serious and intractable issues, many of which relate to operational
priorities for federal water projects. Sandra Zellmer identified many of the big issues on
the Missouri in a 2004 article. See generally Sandra B. Zellmer, A New Corps of Discovery
for Missouri River Management, 83 NEB. L. REV. 305 (2004). That same year, a
controversy over water withdrawals prompted the National Research Council to produce a
report on Columbia River management that provided an overview of many of the issues
posed by declining salmon populations in the basin. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
MANAGING THE COLUMBIA RIVER: INSTREAM FLOWS, WATER WITHDRAWALS, AND
SALMON SURVIVAL (2004).

182 A recent study of water rights and water supplies in California concluded that the
state has already allocated aboutfive times more water than its rivers actually carry in an
average year. Theodore E. Grantham & Joshua H. Viers, 100 Years of California's Water
Rights System: Patterns, Trends and Uncertainty, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2014)
(comparing the face value of existing appropriative water rights with mean annual runoff
in California). The study also concluded that 16 of the state's 27 major rivers had water
allocations exceeding mean annual runoff, the most over-allocated was the heavily
irrigated San Joaquin River Basin, with existing water rights 861% greater than average
flow. Id. at 5.
183 California's water problems have produced several legislative proposals in the
current Congress, including both the dueling Central Valley drought bills and a major
package for the Klamath. See supra notes 156, 160-62 and accompanying text.
184 Michael Haederle, Texas, New Mexico Tangle Over Water, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25,
2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/j an/25/nationla-na-texas-water-20130126.
185 Scott Streater, Rio Grande: Enviros Sue Obama Admin over Low Flows, Threats to
Species, E&E DAILY (July 24, 2014), available at http://www.eenews.net/login?r=%2F
special reports%2 Fdrought_2012%2Fstories%2FI 060003448.
186 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Interior Bureau of Reclamation, Lake Mead Levels
Drop to Historic Lows (July 8, 2014), available at http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/news
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greater than average supplies by mid-century, 17 and a recent study of
groundwater overdraft suggests that pumping of aquifers in the basin
already far exceeds sustainable levels.' 8 8 Moreover, a recent GAO
study concludes that future water shortages will not be limited to a
few famously overworked western river basins. 8 9 Over- allocation is
a big, important problem of national significance, solutions to which
are likely to be expensive and politically difficult ... in short, exactly
the kind of problem that calls out for federal assistance.
CONCLUSION

The twentieth century saw two distinct waves of federal water
policy-water project development and environmental protection-as
Congress tackled massive challenges that exceeded the capabilities of
the private sector and the states. Both waves brought a combination of
federal money and federal requirements, while respecting the key role
of states in water allocation and management. Congress should return
to this formula in addressing the serious and widespread overallocation of water supplies in the western United States, a problem
that climate change will only exacerbate. It is the West's great water
challenge of the twenty-first century, and Congress can help ensure an
effective response by crafting a third wave of federal water policy.

release/detail.cfm?RecordlD=47409 (noting that the water level in Lake Mead had fallen
lower than at any point since the reservoir began filling in the 1930s).
187 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanyirfg text.
188 See Press Release, Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin., Satellite Study Reveals
Parched U.S. West Using Up Underground Water (July 24, 2014), available at http://www
.nasa.gov/press/2014/july/satellite-study-reveals-parched-us-west-using-up-underground
-water/ (describing groundwater overdrafts in the Colorado River Basin over a ten-year
period, with groundwater losses in that time exceeding the volume of Lake Mead). "The
extent of groundwater loss may pose a greater threat to the water supply of the western
United States than previously thought." Id.
189 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FRESHWATER: SUPPLY CONCERNS
CONTINUE, AND UNCERTAINTIES COMPLICATE PLANNING 28 (2014) ("State water
managers continue to expect widespread freshwater shortages in the future, according to
our survey .... Specifically, 40 of 50 state water managers responding to our 2013 survey
expected shortages in some portion of their states under average conditions in the next 10
years."). Of the seventeen western states from the Great Plains to the West Coast, only two
expected no shortages under average conditions over the next decade, whereas twelve
states expected "regional" shortages. See id. at 29.
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